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Abstract 
This dissertation was written as part of Master of Science (MSc) in Transnational and 
European Commercial Law, Mediation, Arbitration and Energy Law at the 
International Hellenic University. 
 
This dissertation notes the vulnerability of intermediated holding systems and 
bitcoin transactions to money laundering activities. It explains why the inherent 
features of the intermediated holding system are not in principle compatible with 
compliance procedures that would make investors’ identities easily accessible at 
every tier of the holding chain for authorities engaged in fighting money laundering. 
It supports the proposition for a central register, within the existing framework of 
intermediated holding systems, where investors’ identities will be recorded. Finally, 
accepts as necessary the Commissions’ proposals for amendments to the 4th Money 
Laundering Directive, assessing that a totally unregulated trade in bitcoin would 
offer a vast field of action to criminals engaged in money laundering.  
Foremost, I would like to express my sincere gratitude to Dr. Thomas Keijser for the 
academic guidance he provided me with for the purpose of writing this dissertation. 
His support has been invaluable in the true sense of the word. Moreover, his deep 
knowledge in the scientific field of intermediated securities combined with his 
patience, motivation and kindness, helped me conclude my work in the most optimal 
way. I could not have imagined having a better advisor and mentor for my thesis. 
Ioannis Paraskevopoulos 
15/2/2017 
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Introduction 
The concealment of the origins of illegally obtained money is known as money 
laundering. While money laundering was originally associated typically with the 
proceeds from drug trafficking, it was subsequently connected with cash and any 
other financial asset acquired by any kind of illegal activity, including tax evasion. The 
methods of obscuring the trail that leads from the financial asset to the criminal and 
the source of the funds used to acquire the asset, vary depending on a number of 
factors. The rapid development of technology which enables dematerialized financial 
assets to be traded rapidly, especially when traded online, diminishes the ability of 
law enforcement authorities to detect the money laundering activity. Especially in 
the case of intangible assets, including dematerialized securities that are 
intermediated and bitcoin, the transactions take place in a highly complex and rapid 
manner that disassociates the asset from the investor or the user in the case of 
bitcoins. In this context, the degree of transparency regarding the identity of the 
investors or the bitcoin users becomes a critical factor for the authorities’ ability to 
trace the criminals and the criminal activity that generated the illegal funds. The 
threat of money laundering activities in the framework of the two aforementioned 
areas will ultimately depend on the transparency requirements effective in relation 
to the personal information of investors in securities and bitcoin users alike. 
 
CHAPTER 1: The EU anti-money laundering legislation 
The ulterior motive of the vast majority of criminal actions lies without a doubt in 
acquiring illegal proceeds. The pillar stone both of past and more recent legislative 
initiatives in the fight against organized crime is the notion that, by limiting or 
eliminating the ability of criminals to circulate their proceeds of crime within the 
financial system and make a profit for themselves, the legislator would be successful 
in weakening the motives of potential criminals to engage in criminal actions. 
Furthermore, in line with the above reasoning, tracing financial assets of suspicious 
origins would contribute in tracing the crimes and the perpetrators. The current 
operative anti-crime model worldwide is based on the aforementioned strategy.  
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In particular, this strategy consists of setting-up law enforcement mechanisms by 
which seizures of property and of other financial assets are enabled, regardless of 
the nature of the financial assets and the time point at which these assets are 
discovered. Furthermore, part of the anti-money laundering strategy is the 
involvement of private entities and institutions, e.g. banks, upon which the legislator 
assigns the task to monitor and detect suspicious transactions that might be 
conducted for the purpose of money laundering. The legislator delegates law 
enforcement authorities not only to institutions holding key-positions in the financial 
market system, but also on natural persons who, due to their professional capacity, 
are likely to transact with criminals pursuing to legitimize their ‘dirty’ money, e.g. 
lawyers. Most importantly, the money laundering strategy is comprised by the 
creation of legal bases that render money laundering a distinct crime, i.e. a stand-
alone crime punishable regardless of the punishment of the predicate offence, and 
the creation of legal bases that permit the confiscation of illicit proceeds by law 
enforcement authorities before the issuance of a court judgment1.  
In the context of EU Law, money laundering is seen as a threat to the soundness, 
integrity and stability of credit and financial institutions, and confidence in the 
financial system as a whole.2 Between 1991 and 2005 three money laundering 
directives were adopted in 1991, 2001 and 2005 and it is notable that the initial 
focus of the 1st Directive was the laundering of the proceeds of certain drug 
offences, however the focus of the subsequent directives included a wider range of 
crimes and extended anti-money laundering obligations to a broader range of 
professions and activities.3 On May 20 2015, the European Parliament and Council 
adopted a 4th Money Laundering Directive to be transposed into national law no 
later than June 2017. From June 26 2017 the 3rd directive currently in effect, and its 
implementation Directive (2006/70/EEC) will be revoked.  
                                                          
1 T. Papakyriakou, (2017), ‘The international regulatory framework for the prevention and suppression 
of money laundering: the rising and establishment of a new model of anti-crime policy’ Lecture 
presented at the Seminar of Aristoteleion University of Thessaloniki Contemporary: ‘Current legal 
issues of financial transactions’ 2-4/2/2017 
2 4th Money Laundering Directive, 2015/849/EU, preamble, para. (4) 
3 Rudi Fortson, ‘Intensifying anti-money laundering laws-the last 30 years’ [2016] Archbold Review, 4, 
6-9 
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The 4th Money Laundering Directive applies to a range of business including banks, 
financial institutions, auditors and accountants. Its rules apply to other kind of 
businesses which make or receive cash payments for goods worth at least 10.000 
euros regardless of the payment method. An important feature of the rules imposed 
by the Directive is, amongst others, the obligation of the Member States to set-up 
and maintain registers that record the ultimate beneficial owners of business. The 
registers will be accessible by national authorities and banks conducting due 
diligence into customers. On 5 July 2016, the European Commission proposed 
amendments to the 4th Money Laundering Directive, which have not entered into 
force until today. These changes provide for enhanced checks towards high risk third 
countries, enhancing the powers of Financial Intelligence Units and giving them swift 
access on bank and payment accounts, and, finally, they bring virtual currency 
exchange platforms under the scope of the Money Laundering Directive, as 
described below in the section of bitcoin regulation.4 
 
CHAPTER 2: Vulnerabilities of the securities markets in relation to money 
laundering 
Money laundering is usually described as consisting of three stages: Placement, 
layering and integration. However, not all money laundering transactions involve all 
three distinct phases and some may involve more (van Duyne 2003). The placement 
stage involves the physical movement of currency or funds produced by illegal 
activities to a place or form less suspicious to law enforcement authorities. Proceeds 
are introduced into financial institutions or into the retail economy. The second 
stage is characterized as layering and involves the separation of proceeds from their 
illegal source by using multiple complex financial transactions to obscure the audit 
trail and hide the funds. The third stage is called integration. Illegal proceeds are 
                                                          
44 Barry Vitou, Michael Ruck and Elena Elia, ‘Anti-money laundering: can money laundering really be 
prevented?’ [2016] Compliance & Risk 2016, 5(5), 2-5 
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converted into apparently legitimate business profits through normal financial or 
commercial activities.5 
Making proceeds appear as legitimate earnings from the financial markets would 
seem relatively easy within the borders of financial markets, given that frequent and 
numerous transactions involving securities take place, while at the same time these 
transactions are often international. Most financial participants do not accept cash 
transactions and consequently the securities sector will be exploited by criminals 
during the layering and integration stage. However, when the predicate offence 
takes place within the financial sector, as in the cases of insider trading or securities 
frauds, the non-cash funds are already present in the financial system and thus a 
placement stage is not necessary. During the layering phase, the criminal can simply 
acquire securities with ‘dirty money’ held in one or more accounts and then use the 
proceeds from this transaction as legitimate money.6 In the case of bearer securities, 
i.e. securities that do not have a registered owner, the security’s owner is simply the 
person who possesses it after the security having been handed over to that person, 
meaning that no paper trail exists that would allow authorities to easily detect the 
initial source of the funds used to acquire the security in question.  
The so-called ‘put’ and ‘call’ transactions constitute another common laundering 
mechanism in the securities sector. A client pays with ‘dirty money’ for a financial 
transaction and the instructed broker places ‘side bets’ on a stock’s gain or loss. The 
broker pays out the winning transaction with ‘clean’ money and destroys the losing 
transaction to avoid suspicion. The client may has merely broken even with this 
transaction in terms of losing or profiting, however profit is not the client’s goal. The 
goal is to provide ‘dirty money’ as inflows in the financial market and get ‘clean 
money’ back at the end of the transaction. This type of transactions is commonly 
encountered in trading derivatives where the high volume of trading activity and a 
high degree of liquidity combined with the large number of brokers who trade the 
                                                          
5 Peter Reuter and Edwin M. Truman, Chasing Dirty Money – The Fight against Money laundering 
(November 2004) chapter 3 p. 25 
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derivatives obscures the connection between each new participant and the original 
trade.7 
Consequently, the securities market is a potentially attractive mechanism for money 
laundering. The attraction derives from the variety and complexity of the financial 
instruments traded, the ease and speed of transaction execution, e.g. online 
auctions, and the ability to execute international transactions. Securities can be used 
to ‘break the chain’ of documented transactions, to disguise the signs of illegal 
transactions and to justify high profits.8 Suspicious transactions reporting in the 
sector remains relatively low because of the aforementioned inherent features of 
securities trading and possibly because of lack of awareness and insufficient 
securities-specific indicators.9 The complexity of securities trading in the financial 
system seems much more acute in the case of intermediated securities where 
transparency issues arise as regards the identification of the beneficial owners.  
 
CHAPTER 3: Money laundering in intermediated holding systems 
In this chapter an analysis of the inherent characteristics of the intermediated 
holding system is attempted, in comparison to other holding systems, in order to 
establish why these very attributes of that particular holding system might 
potentially offer a more ‘privileged’ field of action for money launderers, given that 
its basic features do not promote the disclosure of the investors identity. 
Subsequently, the reasoning behind the proposal for a central register of investors 
within the intermediated holding system is analyzed. 
3.1 Set-up of intermediated holding systems 
Intermediated holding chains constitute a pillar stone of the global financial system. 
They contribute both in the development of economies of scale as regards the 
                                                          
7 Stephen Schneider, ‘Money Laundering through securities an analysis of Canadian Police cases’ 
[2004] 4 Asper Rev. Int’l Bus. & Trade L. 169 2004 
8 Moneyval, Typology research – Use of securities in money laundering schemes (2008) Problem 
Overview Chapter 1 p. 9 
9 FATF, Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing in the Securities Sector (October 2009)  
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transactional costs, and in the increase of the securities mobility.10 Indeed, the 
movement of huge amounts of capital between investors and governments and the 
financing of companies and financial organizations, both take place in an efficient, 
speedy and cost-effective manner thanks to the operation of a reliable intermediary 
holding system within a global financial market. The investors pursue future cash 
flows deriving from shares, bonds and other debt instruments. The rights issued to 
investors are negotiable and their value lies, to a great extent, on this very feature 
that enables investors to re-sell their rights to other investors in the capital markets.   
The term “intermediated securities” refers to a holding system where banks and 
other financial institutions rely on central securities depositories (CSDs) for the 
safekeeping of their own securities and of their clients’ securities. The physical 
delivery of securities, that used to take place in the past for the purpose of 
safekeeping or transfer, gave its way to a form of electronic book-keeping where 
securities are not delivered as moveable property but are rather credited or debited 
in securities accounts maintained by CSDs for their participating financial 
institutions. The participating financial institutions or “intermediaries” provide 
accounts for their client-investors and for their client-intermediaries and, in turn, 
those clients maintain accounts for other persons and so on, forming a securities 
holding chain that reaches down the ultimate account holder.11 The transition from 
physical delivery of security to electronic means of transfer took place through the 
use of techniques that tackled the problem of too much paper, namely 
immobilization and dematerialization. Before an analysis of these techniques is 
attempted, certain terminology issues should be addressed. 
In figure 1 below one can observe the illustration of the intermediated holding chain. 
Given that both in bibliography and in papers issued by international organizations, 
e.g. guidance, typology reports and other, some of the terms used to designate and 
                                                          
10 Financial Crime Compliance Principles for Securities Custody and Settlement – Background and 
Overview, International Securities Services Association (ISSA), 6 October 2015, p.4 
http://issanet.org/pdf/2015-10-05_ISSA_Background_Overview_Final.pdf  
11 Luc Thevenoz, ‘The Geneva Securities Convention: objectives, history, and guiding principles’ in 
Pierre – Henri Conac, Ulrich Segna and Luc Thevenoz (eds), Intermediated Securities The Impact of the 
Geneva Securities Convention and the Future European Legislation (Cambridge University Press 2013) 
p. 3-9 
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describe the participants of that chain might not be used under the same meaning or 
in the same context, the illustration below is useful in order to clarify the meaning of 
some of the terms employed in the present paper. 
 
 
 
Figure 1: The intermediated holding chain 
The above figure depicts the intermediated system in highly simplified form. Main 
actors who participate in the system is the issuer, the central securities depository 
(CSD), intermediaries and account holders or investors. Typical issuers of securities 
are governments, in the case of bonds, and commercial enterprises which issue 
shares or bonds. Depositories where paper securities are kept, may maintain or not 
electronic records and are responsible for safekeeping and/or proper administration. 
Intermediaries, such as banks or other financial institutions, stand between the 
issuer and the ultimate investor. They maintain accounts reflecting their own 
securities holdings and those of their account holders. The chain of intermediaries 
might be complex, including a large number of actors and multiple jurisdictions. The 
end of the chain includes the account holders or investors, which have the ultimate 
legal and/or economic interest. The ultimate account holder and the investor may be 
one and the same, but this is not necessarily so. Some investors do not form part of 
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the intermediated chain, preferring to remain anonymous and operate through 
nominees. An entity in the middle of the chain may at the same time qualify both as 
intermediary in relation to its lower tier account holder and as account holder in 
relation to its upper-tier intermediary.12 
A different terminology is encountered in the Financial Crime Compliance Principles 
for Securities Custody and Settlement (ISSA, 27 August 2015). Under the IOSCO 
Principles on Client Identification and Beneficial Ownership for the Securities 
Industry of 2004, correspondent banks may undertake due diligence on their 
equivalently regulated financial institution customers in order to rely on the 
customers’ programs to identify clients and ultimate beneficial owners. The Financial 
Crime Compliance Principles for Securities Custody and Settlement (ISSA, 27 August 
2015) provides guidance to Custodians on the appropriate due diligence measures. 
The term ‘Custodians’ is used to designate the financial institutions that participate 
in the holding chain, which under the ISSA Principles (FCCP) is called a ‘custody 
chain’, and hold for clients that constitute institutional account holders named as 
‘Account Holders’. Account Holders are defined as the regulated financial institutions 
that act as Customers or Clients of the Custodians. In the context of these Principles, 
Custodians include but are not limited to banks acting as global custodians and sub-
custodians, fund distributors, banks, brokers, International Central Securities 
Depositories and Central Securities Depositories, to the extent that cross-border 
operations are involved. Custodians are used by their Customers for the safekeeping 
of proprietary and third party interests in the securities, the settlement and clearing 
of securities trades and ancillary services including corporate action processing, 
securities lending and collateral management. These services might be provided for 
the Customer’s own account and/or for the account of the Customer’s clients 
(Clients of the Account Holder or Clients). The Clients of the Account Holder may be 
individuals, legal entities or even other financial institutions.13  
                                                          
12 Roy Goode, Herbert Kronke and Ewan McKendrick, Transnational Commercial Law - Text, Cases and 
Materials (Second edition published in 2015 by Oxford University Press) 
13 The International Securities Services Association (ISSA), Financial Crime Compliance Principles for 
Securities Custody and Settlement (27 August 2015) p. 4-5 
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The transition from physical delivery of security to electronic means of payment took 
place through the use of techniques that tackled the problem of too much paper. 
The first technique that was adopted was the ‘immobilization’ of securities 
certificates to reduce the movement of physical securities in the marketplace and to 
facilitate book entry transfers. The certificates were held by a central depository who 
held for one or more intermediaries, who, in turn, held for investors or other 
intermediaries. The intermediaries participating in the relevant holding chain keep 
electronic records of the securities and this enables them to perform trading and 
settlement operations in a speedy and cost-effective manner. The end-investor 
down the holding chain, or the nominee of the investor, is the securities account 
holder and the second tier intermediary who acts as an account provider is the bank 
or other financial institution. A specific holding chain may be comprised of more 
than two intermediaries that each holds the securities for the intermediary 
immediately down the chain. The securities certificates, and in some cases a ‘jumbo’ 
certificate, are held by a Central Securities Depository which holds for the issuer. 
This means that the issuing company does not register each and every investor who 
holds part of the share capital and the transfer of the shares does not require, in 
order for the transfer of ownership to take effect, their physical delivery to the buyer 
and the registration of the transaction with the issuer company register. Bearer 
securities are usually held as global notes while registered securities, including equity 
securities, can also be immobilized.  
Another technique to deal with too much paper, which led to expensive and slow 
trading of securities, was to dematerialize securities. The electronic entry on the 
books of a central operator suffices to produce a constitutive effect, i.e. the very 
existence of the right derives from the electronic entry per se. The fast electronic 
settlement of transactions which is achieved as a result of immobilization and 
dematerialization contributes a great deal in the efficient and fast completion of 
15 
 
millions of every day transactions which otherwise, in the event that physical 
delivery of papers was required, could not be concluded.14 
Thanks to the development of the above techniques, traditional holding, where the 
investor received a certificate for his securities which was safely kept by a bank, was 
replaced by an intermediated holding system where all security certificates are 
“immobilized” and centrally kept in the Central Securities Depository or were 
dematerialized. As already described, the investor holds his securities with his own 
bank, the bank holds them through a second bank (second-tier intermediary) and 
finally an intermediary holds the securities with the CSD where the certificates are 
kept. The number of intermediaries that form part of that chain may differ every 
time. There are jurisdictions with so-called “transparent systems”, i.e. investors hold 
their securities directly with the CSD and there is only one top-level intermediary. 
However, other institutions may share functions with the top-level intermediary and 
are also called intermediaries. The performance of functions of intermediaries by 
other persons is provided for in article 7 of the Unidroit Convention on Substantive 
Rules for Intermediated Securities. For example, in State A all governments bonds 
are held with the Central Bank. Investors in government bonds open a securities 
account with the Central Bank with the assistance of a commercial bank which acts 
for the account of the Central Bank in this context. All instructions are given to the 
commercial bank which, through a technical interface and under specific 
arrangements with the Central Bank causes government bonds to be credited and 
debited to the securities account.15 In other jurisdictions, the holding chain could be 
comprised by only one or more intermediaries. In cross-border transactions holding 
chains may involve many intermediaries in different jurisdictions. Within an 
intermediated holding system, the transfer of securities is achieved by entries in the 
electronic records of the participating intermediaries, whereby entries are made in 
the form of credits and debits recorded in the relevant securities accounts of the 
                                                          
14 Louise Gullifer, ‘Ownership of Securities - The Problems Caused by Intermediation’ in Louise Gullifer 
and Jennifer Payne (eds), Intermediated Securities Legal Problems and Practical Issues (Hart Publishing 
2010) p. 1-3 
15 Hideki Kanda, Charles Mooney, Luc Thevenoz, Stephane Beraud assisted by Thomas Keijser, Official 
Commentary on the Unidroit Convention on Substantive Rules for Intermediated Securities (Oxford 
University Press 2012) p. 45-46 
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investors involved in the transaction. Depending on the “distance” between sender 
and receiver of the relevant securities within the framework of the particular holding 
chain, one or more intermediaries would have to perform the credits and debits and 
therefore change the account balances.16 The ease of transfer, especially through 
netting, is indisputable compared to the traditional holding system that required the 
physical delivery of securities. 
3.2 Distinctions between different holding systems 
The trust model is mainly effective in England and Wales, while similar models may 
be found in Ireland, Australia and other common law countries. Under the trust 
model, the issued securities are safe-kept by the CSD, which in England is called the 
CREST system and is operated by Euroclear UK & Ireland. The CSD has no legal 
interest in the securities and resembles to the company register as provided for in 
corporate law. The participants of the CREST systems (intermediaries) are treated as 
the legal owners of the securities which they hold for their clients or for their own 
account. The account holder of the above system, who holds its securities with a 
financial institution, is the actual beneficiary assuming the role of a trustor and has 
an equitable ownership right in the securities. When many tiers exist in the holding 
chain, the holder of an equitable interest is considered as a trustee for its own client, 
which is the case for all intermediaries down the chain until the end-investor who is 
the beneficial owner. The investor, in this case, has an equitable ownership in the 
securities that are held for him by the account provider (trustee). The beneficial 
owner enjoys in praxis approximately the same rights of a legal owner but legally its 
rights are not described as ‘full ownership rights’ but as ‘equitable ownership in an 
equitable ownership in the securities’.17  
                                                          
16 European Parliament, Directorate General for Internal Policies, Policy Department A: Economic and 
Scientific Policy, Economic and Monetary Affairs, Cross-border issues of securities law: European 
efforts to support securities markets with a coherent legal framework (IPA/ECON/NT/2011-09 MAY 
2011) p.10-11 
17 European Parliament, Directorate General for Internal Policies, Policy Department A: Economic and 
Scientific Policy, Economic and Monetary Affairs, Cross-border issues of securities law: European 
efforts to support securities markets with a coherent legal framework (IPA/ECON/NT/2011-09 MAY 
2011) p.14-15 
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The security entitlement model is similar to the trust model but, still, bears 
significant differences. The USA and Canada are the two countries where the 
particular model applies, the CSD being called, in the case of the USA, ‘Depository 
and Trust Company’. The legal owner of the securities entitlements is a 100% 
subsidiary company of the NYSE. Each account holder has a right described as 
‘security entitlement’ against his account provider. Moving up the holding chain, 
each intermediary, besides acting as an account provider, is also an account holder 
who possesses a security entitlement against its upper-tier account provider. As far 
as the legal nature of the right of ‘security entitlement’ is concerned, it is similar but 
not identical to legal ownership or equitable interest. For the final investor the 
‘securities entitlement right’ encompasses substantial rights regarding the receipt of 
dividends, interests and participation in the general meetings of companies, 
according to the provisions of the account agreement. The investor lacks the right to 
claim the securities as its own assets as a whole and, on the contrary, is obliged to 
share them at its prorate values with other entitlement holders of that particular 
type of financial asset. Consequently, the investor may not assert a claim regarding 
its securities at the upper level of the holding chain given that he is not the holder of 
a right of exclusive ownership of certain specified financial assets but rather holds a 
pro rata interest18. Therefore, one could describe it as a type of co-ownership. The 
difference from the equitable interests under English law lies with the fact that 
security entitlements do not ‘overlap’.19 While trustors under English law enjoy 
equitable ownership in an equitable ownership and thus hold rights that concern the 
same underlying assets, every security entitlement against an account provider is 
distinct from the security entitlements that the account provider itself holds.20 
                                                          
18 Louise Gullifer, ‘Ownership of Securities - The Problems Caused by Intermediation’ in Louise Gullifer 
and Jennifer Payne (eds), Intermediated Securities Legal Problems and Practical Issues (Hart Publishing 
2010) p. 23 
19 European Parliament, Directorate General for Internal Policies, Policy Department A: Economic and 
Scientific Policy, Economic and Monetary Affairs, Cross-border issues of securities law: European 
efforts to support securities markets with a coherent legal framework (IPA/ECON/NT/2011-09 MAY 
2011) p.16 
20 European Parliament, Directorate General for Internal Policies, Policy Department A: Economic and 
Scientific Policy, Economic and Monetary Affairs, Cross-border issues of securities law: European 
efforts to support securities markets with a coherent legal framework (IPA/ECON/NT/2011-09 MAY 
2011) p.16 
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However, both under US and English law, account holders may exercise their claims 
only against their immediate account providers and not against upper intermediaries 
or the CSD. 
The undivided property model is adopted by French law. In this model only 
dematerialized securities are traded. The CSD acts as a mere register and neither the 
CSD or any intermediaries have legal interests or rights in the securities. Full 
proprietary rights belong to the investors and the securities are considered to be 
located directly in their securities accounts, while at the same time they can access 
their securities only through their account providers and not through upper tier 
intermediaries.21 
The pooled property model entails the creation of a sui generis type of shared 
property. The investor is neither the legal owner of a number of individual financial 
assets nor the holder of separate rights but rather the holder of by nature 
proportionate rights (e.g. a tenth share in the share capital of a company). Another 
theoretical approach supports the idea that each account holder has a co-ownership 
interest in the securities that lie in the pooled account under a relative provision of 
the account agreement.22 Consequently, the investor is not deemed as the possessor 
of the securities and has access to his securities only through his account provider 
while other upper tier account providers are unable to identify him given that he is 
not the holder of individual objects which can be distinguished in the pooled 
accounts.23 
The transparent model is adopted by the Nordic countries, Greece, Poland, Brazil, 
China and others. The CSD holds directly for the investors while banks and other 
                                                          
21 European Parliament, Directorate General for Internal Policies, Policy Department A: Economic and 
Scientific Policy, Economic and Monetary Affairs, Cross-border issues of securities law: European 
efforts to support securities markets with a coherent legal framework (IPA/ECON/NT/2011-09 MAY 
2011) p.17 
22 Louise Gullifer, ‘Ownership of Securities - The Problems Caused by Intermediation’ in Louise Gullifer 
and Jennifer Payne (eds), Intermediated Securities Legal Problems and Practical Issues (Hart Publishing 
2010) p. 22-23 
23 European Parliament, Directorate General for Internal Policies, Policy Department A: Economic and 
Scientific Policy, Economic and Monetary Affairs, Cross-border issues of securities law: European 
efforts to support securities markets with a coherent legal framework (IPA/ECON/NT/2011-09 MAY 
2011) p.18 
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financial institutions are not providers of securities accounts but only operate the 
account opened with the CSD according to the relevant national law rules, as 
described in article 7 of the Geneva Convention. Consequently, the beneficial owners 
enjoy a direct property interest in the securities that is separate and not shared with 
other investors. Obviously, the operation of the above mentioned accounts takes 
place according to the rules and within the legal and technical framework of the 
relevant jurisdiction24.  
The classification of the securities holding system which followed the criterion 
whether the investor had a proprietary in nature right linking him directly to his 
securities or merely a claim against his intermediary, lead to the distinction between 
direct and indirect holding systems. However, the above described distinctions have 
been concluded on the basis of more detailed and diverse criteria, which leaves 
considerable doubts whether the direct/indirect distinction has a practical 
significance. If one should take note, for example, of the pooled property model then 
one would assert, at a conceptual and theoretical level, that the particular holding 
systems are direct in the sense that a sui generis in rem right is enjoyed by the 
investor, yet the investor could exercise his claims only against his account provider 
as no upper intermediary would recognize and identify any such separate in rem 
rights. It is obvious that the notion of ‘direct’ here has merely an academic substance 
with no practical implications given that the financial assets held by upper 
intermediaries are somewhat cut-off from the end investor. Transparent holding 
systems seem like the only systems that fully comply with the definition of a direct 
holding system25. 
 
 
                                                          
24 European Parliament, Directorate General for Internal Policies, Policy Department A: Economic and 
Scientific Policy, Economic and Monetary Affairs, Cross-border issues of securities law: European 
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Scientific Policy, Economic and Monetary Affairs, Cross-border issues of securities law: European 
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3.3 The position of investors in the intermediated securities holding systems 
A great number of intermediaries provide their services in the areas of the trade and 
the clearing and settlement of securities. The excessive number of transaction and 
settlement systems has been commented upon by scholars and participants of the 
financial services industry. According to the Lamfalussy report26, this very situation 
may “fragment liquidity and increase costs, especially for cross-border clearing and 
settlement”. The first Giovannini report27 characterizes the EU market in clearing and 
settling trades as highly fragmented. But today as well, given that each of the 
involved intermediaries spends money on operating facilities and staff, and naturally 
pursues a profit and not only to cover the costs, it is obvious that the overall cost of 
holding intermediated securities rises dramatically.  
However, the cost is not the only burden on the shoulders of the investor who 
invests in an intermediated holding system. There is an inherent legal risk of the 
investor’s interests not accurately and adequately being protected due to the 
existence of many layers of intermediation between the end-investor and the issuer 
that create a significant gap.28 Indeed, within the framework of an intermediated 
holding chain, each participant contracts with the intermediary of the immediately 
upper or lower tier. An agreement is reached, and the relevant documents are 
drafted and signed, between the CSD and the intermediary directly connected with 
it. This intermediary then has a contractual relationship with the second 
intermediary down the chain, until the lowest tier intermediary who is acting as the 
account provider of the end investor and has signed an account agreement with the 
investor client. All of these agreements are bilateral. When two intermediaries sign 
the agreement they actually agree on terms that are binding and create rights and 
obligations between them alone. As a result, a breach of contract on their behalf 
would be constituted if the specific terms included in that contract were not upheld, 
given that a legal link exists only between those two intermediaries, regardless 
                                                          
26 Final Report of the Committee of Wisemen on the Regulation of European Securities Markets 
(Brussels, 15 February 2001) 
27 The Giovanini Group, Cross-border Clearing and Settlement Arrangements in the European Union 
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28 Eva Micheler, ‘Transfer of Intermediated Securities and Legal Certainty’ in Thomas Keijser (ed), 
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whether specific acts or omissions of the two intermediaries are in line with the 
contractual terms of the agreement between the investor and its account provider 
or between two other intermediaries. Therefore, in determining the terms of the 
contract between them, the two intermediaries do not feel compelled to fully 
synchronize and adapt their terms with the contractual provisions of the other 
contracts but they rather prefer to focus on including terms that they consider less 
risky, in terms of how likely it is not to be able to comply with those terms by 
fulfilling an obligation towards their counterparty, as in that case they would be in 
breach of contract and liable against the counterparty intermediary (e.g. ensure that 
there is a reasonable amount of time to pass on instructions or payments to the level 
immediately below or above them).29 But disregarding or not prioritizing or not 
aligning with the contractual provisions that are relevant to the end investor’s rights 
practically entails the likelihood that the documentation created between 
intermediaries up the chain lacks the inclusion of those terms that safeguard the 
investor’s interests or perhaps ‘waters down’ its interests. Indeed, if the contracts of 
the intermediaries up the chain provide for more time to pass on instructions or 
reject liability of the intermediary for certain mistakes, then obviously the above 
provisions are detrimental for the ultimate investor. Furthermore, processing 
corporate actions, voting actions, income, information flows, could be very 
problematic in an intermediated holding chain. Especially in cross-border holdings, 
investors with interests in different jurisdictions assign management of their assets 
to institutions that act as global custodians constituting an additional tier in the 
holding chain. This could deter the velocity of the information flows between 
ultimate investors and issuers. In regard to income collection, the investor’s account 
might be credited with the income on a later date given that the due processing of 
corporate actions might cause delays.30 Cross-border voting rights may also be 
difficult to exercise in cross-border holding chains.  
                                                          
29 Eva Micheler, ‘Transfer of Intermediated Securities and Legal Certainty’ in Thomas Keijser (ed), 
Transnational Securities Law (Oxford University Press 2014) p. 122 
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If one had to extract a conclusive remark commenting on the investor’s position in 
the intermediated holding chain, one would highlight the existing gap that seems to 
exist between the issuer and the ultimate investor. There are inherent legal risks 
deriving from this gap concerning the protection of the investor’s interests, 
corporate and others. It seems that the greater the number of intermediaries, the 
greater the risk lies. National laws effective in each jurisdiction determine the degree 
of protection of the investors, e.g. in cases where an insolvent intermediary does not 
hold sufficient securities to cover the amount credited to account holders. Yet, the 
inherent legal risk of an intermediated holding chain due to the gap between the 
issuer and the investor always remains, notwithstanding all of its advantages for the 
investor and the integrity and efficiency of the financial markets. 
3.4 Transparency and non-transparency of holding systems in relation to money-
laundering threats 
In a transparent holding system, the question of beneficial ownership seems 
relatively simple. The CSD knows the identity of all account holders and has a 
relationship with them while all transfers are entered on a central register. The 
record of transfers at the CSD level has constitutive effects and, apart from the 
existence of a top-level intermediary, there might be other banks or other financial 
institutions sharing functions. On the other hand, in non-transparent holding 
systems the CSD cannot identify their particular account holders. The relationships 
between the CSD and the intermediaries are independent from the relationships 
between the intermediaries and the account holders.31 All the information flows 
concerning the holding and transfer of securities takes place only between the 
transacting participants. Each party only knows about the party immediately below 
or above them in chain, i.e. an intermediary knows its account holders but, in case 
that these account holders act as account providers as well, does not know their 
clients – account holders or any other account holders down the chain, and naturally 
does not know the end investor. Given the above lack of information, the rights of 
account holders are limited to the intermediary immediately above them, which 
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constitutes the “no-look-through principle”.32 This principle does not allow an 
account holder to exercise a claim against any upper-tier intermediary other than its 
account provider immediately above him in chain. If that was not the case and 
upper-tier intermediaries could be sued by the account holder, the higher tier 
intermediary would have to gather information from participants down the chain to 
defend itself against the claims and this, inevitably, would lead to complex situations 
that would increase costs and eliminate many advantages of the intermediated 
holding system. This very lack of information is also the reason behind prohibiting 
upper-tier attachment. If, for example, a creditor attempts to enforce its debt 
against assets of an investor by attaching the investor’s securities account with its 
account provider, that would be acceptable. But if the creditor attached a pooled 
account higher in the holding chain on the basis that the debtor holds his shares 
‘somewhere in the pooled account’ together with shares of the same description 
that belong to other beneficiaries, then the upper-tier intermediary is in no position 
to identify which separate shares belong to the debtor because it would have no 
records that the particular investor has an interest in the specific type of securities. 
Then, complying with the attachment order would mean that the entire issue of the 
particular type of shares should be frozen and other investors would not be allowed 
to trade these securities to the detriment of the efficiency and integrity of the 
financial system.33 This rule of prohibition of upper-tier attachment is included in 
article 22 of the Geneva Convention. 
 All of the above leads to the conclusion that information on the identity of the 
beneficial owner of securities, whether a legal entity or a natural person, its business 
activities and possibly the sources of its funds, all lie with the information recorded 
in the initial account agreement signed with the bank or the institution acting as an 
account provider. The flows of these information not only are incompatible with the 
legal structure of an intermediated holding system, where each intermediary relates 
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with the immediately below or above it in chain participant, but one could detect a 
tension with the desirable effects of the no-look-through principle that was analyzed 
in the above paragraph. Indeed, the existence of that principle has contributes in 
enhancing the legal certainty within the intermediated securities system in the sense 
that each intermediary and the CSD are only liable for fulfilling their obligations 
included in the contracts they signed as account holders or account providers and 
not for actions or omissions of other participants below or above them in chain, i.e. 
the rights conferred on an account holder by a credit may be exercised by the 
account holder only against the relevant intermediary. Additionally, the same 
principle is connected with the efficiency and the scale economies developed within 
such a holding chain. Intermediated securities are transferred by crediting these 
securities to that account holder’s securities account. In the case of pooled 
accounts34, the transfer of securities between two clients of the same intermediary is 
technically easy and simple and entails no delays, while netting is much easier as 
well, which means that transfers of securities between participants of the holding 
chain, depending on their position within the framework of the holding chain, may 
take place faster and in a cost-effective manner because each instruction that leads 
to crediting and debiting of the accounts is not executed separately and externally 
but is rather a part of an offsetting procedure between the values of multiple 
positions and payments due to be exchanged between participants and, thus, a final 
net position is recorded on the accounts of the relevant intermediaries adding to the 
speed and ease of transfer and settlement.35 Consequently, one might argue that the 
legal structure of the intermediated securities holding system based on the no-look-
through principle is characterized by an intrinsic feature: the lack of a direct link 
between the ultimate investor and the trading and settlement process of the 
financial assets that belong to him or, in other words, a form of limitation in the 
ability of the investor to exercise its rights against the issuer. Not only in the sense 
that the investor might be deprived of the ability to directly raise relevant claims 
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against upper-tier intermediaries or the issuer but in the sense that the identity of 
the securities -as separate objects forming part of a pooled account- and the identity 
of that very investor as a natural or legal person, are not to be traced easily up the 
chain of intermediaries and relevant information is to be gathered by the lower tier 
account provider. Especially when netting via pooled accounts take place, it 
practically becomes extremely difficult to trace the transfer of securities from one 
account to another, or for a credit entry to be matched with a particular debit 
entry.36  
3.5 Compliance principles for fighting money laundering in the intermediated 
securities system 
The above designated difficulty to trace the transfer of securities and the identity or 
other information of the beneficial owner of the securities in an intermediated 
securities holding system, undoubtedly create a status of lack of transparency. 
Naturally, in the context of money laundering, the lack of transparency concerning 
the above issues reflects on the lack of transparency as regards the sources of the 
funds used to acquire the financial assets traded within the particular holding 
system. As a result, the concerns that huge illicit funds flow within the global 
financial system are even more acute when it comes to intermediated securities 
where beneficial owners of the traded financial assets are difficult to be traced.  
Naturally, each jurisdiction has its own legal and regulatory framework that dictates 
compliance principles to the domestic participants of the financial market. However, 
mainly in cross-border holding situations things tend to be much more complicated. 
At an international level, the concerns regarding financial crime within the global 
finance system brought the adoption of guidance and principles by participants of 
the financial system. The International Organization of Securities Commissions 
(IOSCO) issued on May 2004 the “Principles On Client Identification and Beneficial 
Ownership for the Securities Industry”. These principles to guide securities 
regulators and serve as important parameters for authorized securities services 
                                                          
36 Louise Gullifer, ‘Ownership of Securities - The Problems Caused by Intermediation’ in Louise Gullifer 
and Jennifer Payne (eds), Intermediated Securities Legal Problems and Practical Issues (Hart Publishing 
2010) p. 14 
26 
 
providers, i.e. regulated entities that perform securities transactions like mutual 
funds, broker dealers, securities firms and others. The above principles highlight the 
common features among the different regulatory approaches to client and beneficial 
owner identification among IOSCO members, despite the differences among the 
legal frameworks effective in different jurisdictions. They aim to contribute to the 
application of a client due diligence process (CDD) in the securities industry so as to 
prevent its exploitation through illegal activities such as money laundering and 
financing of terrorism.37  
In particular, authorized securities service providers (ASSPs), when establishing a 
business relationship with a client should identify and verify the client’s identity 
using reliable, independent source documents, data or other information. Cross-
border omnibus accounts for certain investment vehicles, such as hedge funds, are 
considered as high-risk category of accounts. ASSPs should have specific client due 
diligence policies for omnibus accounts (principle 1a). The relevant recommended 
actions include gathering sufficient information regarding the financial institution 
that opens a segregated account with the ASSPs in order to deposit financial assets 
of its clients-investors contained in a pooled account, assessing the adequacy of that 
financial institution’s CDD process, determining the physical presence of the financial 
institution in the jurisdiction where it is incorporated, assessing the regulatory 
regime of the country in which the financial institution is located, and documenting 
the respective responsibilities of each institution. Furthermore, ASSPs should obtain 
sufficient information in order to identify persons who beneficially own or control 
securities accounts (principle 2)38. Among the recommended actions is the 
certification on behalf of the client to the account provider of the identity of the 
persons who ultimately exercise effective control over a legal person. Know your 
client (KYC) practices, record keeping on the CDD process for at least five years, third 
party reliance and principles regarding the role of the regulator, form also a part of 
the principles of IOSCO. 
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The International Securities Services Association (ISSA) issued the ‘Financial Crime 
Compliance Principles for Securities Custody and Settlement’ on 27 August 2015, in 
order to provide global guidance on the establishment and maintenance of cross-
border securities custody relationships. In particular, the principles aim to provide 
guidance to securities custodians, which are regulated financial institutions providing 
safekeeping accounts, securities settlement etc., on how to manage the risks that 
arise from the layers of intermediation between securities issuers and ultimate 
beneficial owners. These Principles, having taken into account the above described 
Principles of IOSCO on client identification and beneficial ownership for the 
securities industry, provide market participants with practical guidance on the 
question of transparency of ownership and control in the intermediated securities 
custody arrangements.39 
According to the already discussed terminology used by the above ISSA Principles, 
the account provider used by its customers for the safekeeping of proprietary and 
third party interests in securities, and the settlement and clearing of securities 
trades, acts as a “custodian”. The custodian financial institution shall be obliged to 
implement appropriate due diligence that will create a risk profile of the particular 
account holder which seeks to do business with the custodian. A strong indication 
that the account holder is not suspicious of conducting illegitimate business is the 
possible compliance of the account holder within a regulatory environment that 
applies and implements the principles of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF). 
However, other information regarding the account holder must be taken into 
account through the due diligence process and its risk profile should be monitored 
and updated periodically. The relevant risk considerations include the account 
holder’s ownership and management structures, its geographic risk and the anti-
money laundering policies that are implemented by the account holder. Additionally, 
the fact that not only the ownership interests of the account holder are 
intermediated but in many cases so are the interests of the account holder’s clients 
should be documented. Consequently, the control must focus on asset holdings and 
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not just on the execution of transactions by asset owners. Therefore, the custodians, 
under the ISSA principles, should communicate to their account hoders their 
requirements regarding documentation relative to the business of the clients of their 
account holders and obtain representations and undertakings relating to them 
contractually, in order for them to control the business of third party clients.40 
Indeed, it should be the responsibility of the custodian to communicate to its 
account holders any relevant KYC standards and other compliance requirements that 
it expects them to follow. The account holder is then responsible for complying with 
these standards. The account holder will deposit securities with the custodian only 
when the assets’ beneficial owners have been subjected to due diligence. In the case 
of omnibus client accounts held for several clients of the account holder, specific 
parameters of the business of the account holders are controlled by the custodians. 
Whether the account holders are regulated and authorized to accept client assets, 
the regulatory framework under which they perform their operations, whether they 
have applied and implemented any specific requirements of the custodian as regards 
their compliance policies, all of the above constitute relevant factors to be taken into 
account by the custodians in order to start or continue to do business with account 
holders that want to open or maintain with the custodian omnibus accounts 
commingling securities held for their clients. The custodian has the right to request 
that the assets’ beneficial ownership of assets deposited on omnibus client accounts 
be disclosed to the custodian via an agreed operational procedure based on 
predetermined risk factors. Pursuant to Principle 17, the custodian should be 
entitled to require its account holder to disclose the identities of the ultimate buyers 
and sellers of securities within a reasonable period in response to a specific request 
predicated on risk factors.41 
The above framework, including guidance and principles of IOSCO and ISSA, is 
extremely useful in recording a general idea that constitutes the pillar stone of the 
anti-money laundering policy of intermediaries that participate in the intermediated 
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holding system. The general idea governing the due diligence process in the 
intermediated securities is that the custodian bank which opens or maintains a 
securities account for another financial institution is obliged to screen and evaluate 
the compliance policies of that financial institution. If the regulatory framework 
under which it operates is adequate and offers the same level of protection against 
money laundering compared to the policy and standards of the custodian, then a 
strong positive indication that allows concluding transactions with the particular 
account holder does exist.  An indirect control method to evaluate the legitimacy of 
the financial assets that are deposited by the beneficial owners and flow within the 
securities holding systems is thus being implemented. A series of factors are taken 
into account and evaluated by the custodian regarding the business of the account 
holder, even the ownership status and the management of the specific entity. 
However, that does not mean that the control on the ultimate investor is direct. 
However, the identity of the beneficial owner of the financial assets is usually 
required, within the framework of a risk-based approach, only according to the 
terms of an agreement between the institutions (the so-called red flags) or in cases 
of enquiries by regulatory or judicial authorities. As explained before, not all 
transfers and not all financial assets could actually be controlled in order to 
determine whether the ultimate investor circulates illegal money by way of investing 
in securities. It would be practically impossible and probably undesirable as regards 
the efficiency of the holding system. A risk-based approach is adopted instead, 
where the existence of certain risk factors, whether they constitute legislative 
provisions or agreed terms between institutions, leads to further control of specific 
securities accounts and transactions which might even lead to disclosing the 
identities of the ultimate buyers and sellers.  
The question that now arises is whether this indirect control suffices to prevent 
money laundering and, if not, what would a realistic alternative be. It is almost self-
evident that a transparent holding system, whereby the identities of the beneficial 
owners would emerge on the records of the CSD, would make things less 
complicated as no “drilling down to the beneficial owners” would be required. 
Nevertheless, a call for transforming intermediated to transparent holding systems 
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in all jurisdictions would obviously not meet the approval of governments and 
banking associations in jurisdictions where intermediated holding systems are 
operative since they would rather protect their respective business models. In any 
case one cannot overlook the advantages of such holding systems for investors and 
the economies worldwide alike. However, there is a strong argument that a 
mechanism could be created whereby the securities holding and transfer systems 
would record the name of ultimate investors on their books, irrespective of whether 
there are any intermediaries between the issuers and investors. A central register, 
possibly at the level of the Central Securities Depository, could be created and 
maintained in that context.  The objective would be to create one central electronic 
system that held and transferred securities for all European jurisdictions. The holders 
of securities would enjoy the benefit of a direct access to that system.42 According to 
those in favor of the idea, the European network of intermediaries was created 
before electronic communication became possible. Now that the technology allows 
the shape of a new computer program for settlement, there is no reason why this 
central electronic system could not be established, except maybe the obstacles that 
might be posed by current actors who represent banking and financial institutions 
participating in the intermediated holding chains as intermediaries and collecting 
fees by performing operations which might not be necessary if the operation of the 
aforementioned central electronic system was to be realized. Such an operation 
would bring about the reduction of costs created by too many intermediaries and 
would bridge the gap between the investors and the issuers. In the context of the 
money laundering issue, it would certainly offer a higher degree of transparency as 
regards the identity of the investors and would reduce the significant administrative 
costs that custodian institutions carry in order to e.g. assess the credibility of a 
foreign account holder that seeks to open a securities account or to comply with 
provisions dictated by national and international regulators. 
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3.6 Liquidity of financial markets and implementation of anti-money laundering 
policies. Are the two compatible? 
Financial markets, including securities markets, are the basic source for financing 
business growth and government spending. Developing deep and liquid financial 
markets across borders constitutes a policy that contributes to the financing of 
business and governments.43 The amounts of capital that are moved within the 
financial markets every day in one direction or the other are overwhelming. Today, 
the efficiency and the systemic stability of the financial markets is still the key for 
financing both the private and the public sector and thus contributing to world 
financial stability. In that context, the amount of capital flows within the financial 
markets is in principle desirable by all the participants of the financial markets. 
The fact that the financial markets have been used in the past and are still being 
used mainly in the “layering” stage of money laundering is also indisputable. The 
mere fact that the implementation of strict money laundering policies, which would 
prevent the inflows of ‘dirty’ money in the system through methods of screening the 
identity of the investors and the sources of their financial assets, would result to 
fewer capital flows, might open a serious discussion on whether governments and 
market participants feel rather at ease with the lack of transparency in 
intermediated securities systems, to the extent that the particular financial market 
remains open and accessible to the inflows of financial assets regardless of the 
legitimacy of their source. Such an argument is recorded in Wolfgang Hetzer’s 
‘Money Laundering and Financial Markets’.44 The author seems to suggest that the 
interests of business, crime and politics coincide to a certain extent, leading to the 
tolerance of inadequate and self-deceptive legislation which is far from effective in 
the combat against ‘dirty money’. Such an argument is naturally difficult to be 
justified by a legal, scientific method of analysis as it refers to the inner incentives of 
policy makers. However, one can assert that, notwithstanding the negative aspects 
of ‘dirty’ money circulating within a financial market for the credibility and the 
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attractiveness of that very market in regard to serious investors, strict compliance 
and anti-money laundering policies adopted by the financial institutions render the 
relevant market unwanted for the investment schemes that seek to keep the 
anonymity of their ultimate investors and subsequently will turn to investing in other 
less heavily regulated markets. 
 
 
CHAPTER 4: Bitcoin transactions and money laundering 
It is widely accepted that the nature of bitcoins, as regards mainly the anonymity of 
the participants of a transaction, renders them vulnerable to money laundering 
threats. The following description of the basic features of bitcoins aims at helping to 
assess the risks posed to the financial system, particularly in the areas of financial 
integrity that might be compromised by money laundering tactics, consumer 
protection, tax evasion and the regulation of capital movements.45 Given that the 
bitcoin is a cryptocurrency, meaning that in principle the identity of the users is not 
publicly exposed, the risk of money launderers taking advantage of the anonymity 
offered to the transacting parties is to be seriously considered. 
 
4.1 Overview of the basic features 
The bitcoin currency is characterized as a decentralized virtual currency. It is 
decentralized because there is no single administrator of the system such as a state 
or banking authority which owns or controls the network or issues currency to the 
users.46 As a result, bitcoins do not represent a claim on an issuer such as 
government or central bank.  And they are indeed a virtual currency because they 
exist only on-line and they do not constitute legal tender in any particular country, as 
in the case of the so-called ‘fiat currencies’. Furthermore, bitcoins fall under the 
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definition of virtual currencies provided by the ECB in 2012, i.e. “a type of 
unregulated digital money which is issued and usually controlled by its developers, 
and used and accepted among the members of a specific virtual community” and by 
the European Banking Authority in 2014, i.e. “a digital representation of value that is 
neither issued by a central bank or a public authority, nor necessarily attached to a 
fiat currency but is accepted by natural or legal persons as means of payment and 
can be transferred, stored or traded electronically”. All of the above unique 
characteristics of virtual currencies that also fit the nature and operation of bitcoins, 
distinguish bitcoins from fiat currencies and other forms of investment or payment 
mechanisms.47 
4.2 Payment system operation in the bitcoin network 
Bitcoin operates through a peer-to-peer network created by multiple individuals 
running the designated software on their individual PCs and connect to each other 
without the involvement of a centralized website or server.48 In peer-to-peer 
networks, every computer connected is an equal partner and can exchange data and 
services with every other member of the network49. The transactions are valid and 
legitimate without the authorization or the approve by a third-party such as bank. 
They are processed and validated based on the principles of cryptography.50 In 
particular, the program is designed to solve a complicated math problem and, once 
the problem is resolved, individual bitcoins are created in a digital form and, in 
particular, in the form of long strings of numbers. The users of the network who 
solve the math problems acquire the newly created bitcoins as a reward for 
contributing their computing powers to resolving the problems. This process is called 
“mining” the bitcoins and the users are called ‘miners’. Mining occurs rather slowly, 
given that, even though more and more computer processing power is dedicated to 
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the math problems solving every day, the program adjusts the difficulty level of the 
math problem over time so that, despite the fact that more computing powers is 
dedicated to the solving process, bitcoins are still released at a controlled and pre-
established rate. Ultimately, there will be approximately 21 million bitcoins in 
circulation.51  
Each transaction is subjected to a cryptographic equation and recorded in ‘blocks’. 
Each new block is a continuation of the previous one and thus a chain is formed, 
called ‘blockchain’. So each transaction on the bitcoin network is recorded on a 
decentralized public ledger, the “blockchain”. The blockchain is visible to all 
computers in the network but does not reveal the identity of the parties involved in 
the transaction because each user’s identity is encrypted. The public ledger, by using 
cryptography, verifies that a user transferring Bitcoin has in fact transferred the 
specified amount of Bitcoin to the user receiving that same amount. Thanks to the 
public ledger and through the use of cryptography the so-called ‘double-spending’ 
problem is confronted, meaning that a participant in a currency market is prevented 
from transferring at the same time a single unit of currency to two different 
recipients.52 
Before a user can trade in bitcoin, the user must download a ‘bitcoin wallet’ 
application in order to obtain both a public and a private key. The public key is 
comprised of a series of characters that form the user’s public address which serves 
as a mark of identification that the user can post on the internet in order to conclude 
a transaction. The private key is known only to the user and he may use it for signing 
his transactions. Buying a product for example would mean that the seller would first 
disclose his public address to the buyer and the latter would generate the 
transaction quantifying his bitcoin payment which is visible by all participants of the 
bitcoin network. The buyer would then sign the transaction with his unique private 
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key. Finally, a miner would verify the transaction and confirm that ‘double-spending’ 
has not occurred.53  
In the above context, the public ledger serves as a list of all past transactions in the 
network. The transactions are recorded in a chronological order and they are made 
publically available. As a result, one could trace back the transaction history of a 
single bitcoin until its very first use. This is possible merely by checking, in each trade 
of the bitcoin, the signature under the relevant respective transactions. These past 
signatures form a chain which involves the specific single bitcoin, due to the fact that 
no two bitcoins can share the same transaction history. 
The above described function of the public ledger system lies in the very heart of the 
characterization of the bitcoin network as a decentralized network, as it renders 
third-party oversight unnecessary. Furthermore, it increases bitcoin liquidity and 
boosts consumer confidence as it excludes the possibility of ‘double spending’. In 
addition, one could argue that there is a great deal of transparency present in the 
bitcoin network since, due to the function of the public ledger, all bitcoin 
transactions are traceable because the public addresses of those involved in each 
specific transaction are recorded. Indeed, a public address cannot reveal directly the 
identity of the user who transacted. However, it can be linked to an IP address 
assigned to devices accessing the Internet and thus the user’s location and personal 
identity can be discovered easily. Because of that possibility, users employed 
software that hides the user’s IP address in order to achieve total anonymity, mainly 
the ‘Onion Router’ (Tor).54 Since Tor enables criminals to transact in bitcoins 
anonymously, money laundering activities might take place at a larger scale. 
4.3 A set of common terms to describe the participants of the bitcoin network 
In FATF’s ‘Virtual Currencies Guidance for a Risk-Based Approach’ (June 2015) a non-
exhaustive list of the basic participants of the virtual currency systems, including 
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bitcoin, are recorded and defined, thus providing a common set of terms. These 
terms, with the same meaning, are used in the present paper as well. 
An exchanger (also called a virtual currency exchange) is a person or entity engaged 
as a business in the exchange of virtual currency (including bitcoin) for real currency, 
funds or other forms of virtual currency and also precious metals, for a fee 
(commission). 
A user is a person or entity who obtains virtual currency (including bitcoin) and uses 
it to purchase real or virtual goods or services or send transfers in a personal 
capacity to another person or who holds the virtual currency as a personal 
investment. 
A miner is an individual or entity that participates in a decentralized virtual currency 
network (bitcoin network) by running special software to solve complex algorithms 
in a distributed proof-of-work or other distributed proof system used to validate 
transactions in the virtual currency system. 
Virtual currency wallet is a means (software application or other mechanism) for 
holding, storing and transferring bitcoins or other virtual currency. 
A wallet provider is an entity that provides a virtual currency wallet, including a 
bitcoin wallet. A wallet provider facilitates participation in a virtual currency system 
by allowing users, exchangers and merchants to more easily conduct the virtual 
currency transactions. The wallet provider maintains the customer’s virtual currency 
balance and generally also provide storage and transaction security. 
4.4. The risk of money laundering in bitcoin transactions 
Bitcoin transactions are, to a significant extent and mainly because of the lack of 
user’s personal identification, vulnerable to abuses by criminals who aim at 
legitimizing their ‘dirty’ money. Their vulnerability lies with the fact that they can be 
traded on the Internet and that anonymous transfers are easily conducted. They are 
usually employed in non-face-to-face customer relationships and may facilitate cash 
funding or third-party funding through exchange transactions where the source of 
the funding remains unknown.  
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In a bitcoin transaction on a peer-to-peer basis, there is no process involved that 
would require the personal identification of the users55. The addresses of ‘bitcoin 
wallets’ do not provide any indication of the user’s names. Instead, they operate as 
accounts with no names or other customer identification attached. The historical 
record of transactions in a ‘block-chain’ does not entail identification and verification 
of the participants.  Additionally, the possible suspicious transactions are not 
monitored by intermediaries, such as banks, and therefore the authorities lack a 
reliable and easily accessible source of relevant information. Law enforcement 
authorities also lack the possibility to target one central entity that operates as 
administrator and pursue investigation or asset seizure in a more effective manner.56 
Consequently, it is hard to trace a transaction due to the anonymity of the users and 
the anonymizing service providers that make the transaction chain unclear.57  
Furthermore, the payment via bitcoins is globally widespread, given that the 
technological requirements that allow a user to transact using bitcoins are actually 
limited to an internet access. As a result, there are no jurisdictional borders. The 
wide spread of the infrastructure hinders the ability of the authorities to effectively 
intercept transactions. In that context, criminals might find it easier to deposit and 
transfer bitcoins globally, rapidly and irrevocably. 
Additionally, the remittance money transfer market is constantly getting bigger. 
While traditionally the predominant players of this market were certain banks and 
companies like the Western Union and MoneyGram, the bitcoin network is more and 
more exploited by those who wish to transfer money across the world because 
payment transfers are conducted in a cheaper, faster and more efficient manner. 
Start-ups using block-chain technology, e.g. Bitspark, Abra, Align Commerce and 
many others, are competing with traditional players in the money transfer market58. 
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This new reality poses a risk that criminals or terrorists would use the bitcoin 
remittance systems and accounts for financing illegal activities. 
All of the above mentioned money laundering risks are to be estimated together 
with the obvious intentions of criminals or terrorists to disguise the origins of 
criminal proceeds59 and to undermine the ability of enforcement authorities to 
obtain evidence and recover criminal assets. The danger is more direct in the case 
where market participants are controlled by criminals, terrorists or related 
organizations.60 
Another important risk factor is associated with the fact that bitcoins, as other 
virtual currencies as well, base their operation on complex infrastructures consisting 
of several entities which transfer funds or execute payments. These entities are 
globally spread and are to be found in many different jurisdictions which means that 
the regulatory status might be unclear, the relevant jurisdiction might not apply 
adequate AML controls and supervision or enforcement might become more 
complex. Indeed, a decentralized virtual currency like bitcoin, where anonymous 
person-to-person transactions take place, sometimes gives the impression of 
operating in a digital framework completely outside the reach of any particular 
jurisdiction.61 
4.5 The use of bitcoin in online black markets 
 Hidden websites fostering the buying and selling of illegal products and services is 
not an uncommon phainomenon in the past years until today. Bitcoins were used as 
a means of payment and transaction within these markets. 
 ‘Silk Road’ was a typical example of such a cyber global black-market where illegal 
drugs, weapons, stolen identity information and other illegal goods and services 
were traded. It was launched in January 2011 and was in operation until September 
2013 when a criminal complaint was launched against its alleged owner and 
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operator. By then, a total sales revenue of USD 1,2 billion (more than 9,5 million 
bitcoins) and USD 80 million in commissions for Silk Road was found to have been 
generated. Since transactions were conducted in bitcoins, the US Department of 
Justice seized approximately 173.991,00 bitcoins from seized computer hardware. 
Bitcoins were the exclusive currency in Silk Road. Using bitcoins, in combination with 
operating on the hidden Tor network, offered the advantage of anonymity to 
participants, given that identification was based only on the anonymous bitcoin 
address, i.e. their account, and did not involve their identification as persons. In 
order to efficiently disguise the sources of their illicit proceeds, criminals who traded 
in Silk Road were using more than one bitcoin addresses, one for each transaction. 
Silk Road offered its users a cryptocurrency ‘tumbler’, or ‘mixing service’, i.e. a 
service aiming at mixing potentially identifiable or tainted cryptocurrency funds with 
others, so as to obscure the trail back to the fund’s original source and thus achieve 
full anonymity bypassing the existence of a public ledger that records the history of 
all the transactions. Still, users of Silk Road were typically using additional 
‘anonymizers’, beyond the above tumbler service, to diminish the possibility that the 
authorities could easily follow a trail leading to the initial transactions that they 
conducted.  
In the above context, Silk Road’s payment system functioned as a bitcoin bank where 
every user held an account in order to buy and sell on the site and also held one or 
many more bitcoin addresses linked with that user’s account and stored on wallets 
maintained on servers that were administered by Silk Road. Buying and selling was 
realized with the implementation of a specific methodology. In particular, the user 
bought bitcoins through a bitcoin exchanger and sent them to a bitcoin address 
linked to his account. In this way, the account was provided with funds and was 
ready to be used for conducting a purchase. At the time of purchase, Silk Road 
transferred the user’s bitcoins to an escrow account it held, while completion of the 
transaction was pending. Subsequently, the buyer’s bitcoins were transferred from 
the escrow account to the bitcoin address of the seller. Furthermore, as discussed 
above, Silk Road was using a ‘tumbler’ in every purchase with the obvious intention, 
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as the site explained, ‘to send all payments through a complex, semi-random series 
of dummy transactions making it nearly impossible to link your payment with any 
coins leaving the site’.62 
 
4.6 The transparency and non-transparency elements of the bitcoin network 
The predominant characterization of the bitcoin network is ‘pseudonymous’ rather 
than ‘anonymous’ network. Indeed, the user’s pseudonym, the bitcoin address that 
is, is recorded but the user’s identity isn’t. In particular, as described above, every 
transaction is recorded in the public ledger. The public addresses of the participants 
of specific transactions are visible and, consequently, all bitcoin transactions are 
traceable. Of course a public address cannot be linked directly to a person’s identity 
and is only linked to an Internet Protocol Address (IP address), i.e. a unique 
numerical label assigned to each device participating in a computer network that 
uses the internet protocol for communication. This practically means that since 
public addresses in the bitcoin lead to IP addresses, then this would allow the 
discovery of the user’s location and personal identity. However, users employed 
anonymizing software which hides a user’s IP address and facilitates total 
anonymity.63 
Given that there are no intermediaries who act as regulators or administrators, every 
transaction must be made public in order for all the participants to verify the validity 
of the transactions. Therefore, every single transaction is recorded in the online 
ledger. This very attribute of the bitcoin network constitutes the heart of the 
argument that bitcoin could actually be the most transparent payment method ever 
employed.64 According to the reasoning of that argument, since every transaction is 
recorded and is publicly available in the block-chain, identities can be linked to 
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bitcoin addresses, despite the fact that laundering tools like ‘mixers’ or ‘tumblers’ 
are employed by certain criminal users in their effort to break up the paper trail by 
exchanging one set of bitcoins for another with different addresses and transactions 
histories. These laundering tools might actually not perform their objective as far as 
large volumes are concerned and, additionally, the laundering process itself might be 
traced on the block-chain. In Silk Road, bitcoin transactions proved to be far from 
anonymous. The prosecution managed to furnish evidence, based on FBI’s 
investigation results, that the accused person was indeed the operator of Silk Road 
as more than 700.000 bitcoins had been transferred from the Silk Road wallet 
directly to a wallet on the accused person’s laptop. FBI’s special agents managed to 
prove the aforementioned facts by investigating the transactions history recorded on 
the block-chain that formed a trail leading back to the criminal user whose identity 
was revealed.65 The argument in favor of the existence of transparency in the bitcoin 
network estimates that, as in the case of Silk Road, identities can be linked to bitcoin 
addresses in many other cases as well. It should also be noted that the disclosure of 
both the user’s bitcoin address and the user’s identity to someone, perhaps in the 
case where the user transacts with an online retailer or with services that require 
information on the customer’s identity, practically entails the leaking of the user’s 
personal information which might, in turn, lead to the detection of all of the user’s 
past and future transactions. In that context, law enforcement authorities always 
have a paper trail to follow when seeking the source of illicit funds and this renders 
bitcoin transactions traceable and, consequently, not particularly attractive to 
money launderers.66 
On the other hand, one could hardly describe the bitcoin network as a fully 
transparent payment system, given that the identity of the users is not transparent. 
The lack of transparency and of easy access of the authorities to the personal 
information of the possible criminal user cannot be fully substituted by the possible 
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traceability based on the transactions’ history recorded on the ledger, especially 
when complex software is widely used by criminals to obscure the trail of those 
transactions. Overall, notwithstanding that elements of transparency do exist in the 
bitcoin network, its inherent characteristics facilitate the conduct of transactions in 
an ultimately non-transparent manner. These main inherent features are relevant 
with the fact that there is no central administrative authority which could be 
subjected to regulation and, additionally, with the fact that the user’s personal 
information remains hidden with only a mere possibility that this identity could be 
traced by law enforcement authorities. Consequently, due to the fact that criminal 
users could transact within the network while obscuring the trail that leads to the 
disclosure of their identity, one would be inclined to agree that the bitcoin network 
constitutes a ‘friendly’ environment for money laundering purposes. 
4.7 EU regulation of bitcoin transactions 
Payment transactions in a decentralized virtual currency, like bitcoin, are 
characterized by the absence of a third party intermediary. Instead, payments made 
in bitcoins are transmitted from buyer to seller through public and private keys 
functioning according to the principles of cryptography, while at the same the 
completed transactions are irreversible. In this context, the payment process in 
bitcoins falls outside the EU regulatory framework of electronic money and payment 
services. 
In particular, virtual currencies like bitcoin do not incorporate a claim on an issuing 
state or banking authority, in contrast with electronic money which represent a 
claim on the electronic money issuer and are issued in exchange for funds. On the 
contrary, new bitcoins result from mining. Therefore, bitcoins do not constitute 
electronic money and do not fall under the scope of the EU Electronic Money 
Directive (2009/110/EC). Furthermore, bitcoins also fall outside the scope of the EU 
Payment Services Directive (2007/64/EC), regulating certain types of payment 
services by certain payment institutions. First of all, most of the provisions of the 
aforementioned Directive apply only to payment services made in euro or a currency 
of a Member State outside the euro area and, therefore, do not apply to 
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transactions in virtual currencies. Moreover, the payment service providers which 
fall under the Directive’s scope and that might be considered relevant to virtual 
currencies, are e-money institutions and payment institutions. As noted above, 
bitcoins cannot be considered as electronic money. As far as payment institutions 
are concerned, they are defined by the Directive as entities authorized to provide 
and execute payment services, where payment services are defined as any business 
activity listed in the Annex to the Directive. If one examined how ‘payment services’ 
are defined in the Annex, one would find that in-scope payment services are the 
ones that funds are received from a payer without any payment accounts being 
created for the purpose of transferring a corresponding amount to another party. 
The definition of ‘funds’ is limited to banknotes, coins, scriptural and electronic 
money and, therefore, virtual currencies like bitcoins are excluded. Furthermore, 
under ‘payment services’ in the above Annex lies the description of services provided 
by technical service providers which support the provision of these services without 
entering into possession of the transferred funds at any time. Such technical service 
providers in the bitcoin network are generally the miners verifying the transactions 
and wallet developers. Therefore, such services do not fall under the scope of the 
Payment Services Directive.67 Taking into account all of the above, a general 
conclusion regarding bitcoin transactions and their relationship with e-money and 
payment services would be that since bitcoin transactions do not involve any 
processing by third parties other than the verification process, they seem to 
resemble closer to cash transactions. However, cash transactions are specifically 
excluded from the PSD. 
Directive (EU) 2015/849, or ‘4AMLD’, did not include a reference to virtual currency 
exchanges. However, after the terrorist attacks in France in 2015, the Commission 
published an Action Plan to strengthen the fight against the financing of terrorism on 
2 February 2016. In this Plan, the Commission proposes that certain aspects of the 
Directive should be re-examined towards the direction of building a more efficient 
defense against terrorist finance. One of these aspects was the issue of anonymity 
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associated with the purchase and use of virtual currencies. On 5 July 2016 the 
Commission published its proposals for amendments to the 4AML Directive in 
response to the EU Council’s conclusions of February 2016 on the fight against the 
financing of terrorism and following the parallel resolution and report of the 
European Parliament in May 2016, in which the EP proposed that the Commission 
develop recommendations for any legislation required to regulate the virtual 
currencies sector.  
The aforementioned proposals of the Commission included taking actions to bring 
custodian wallet providers and virtual currency exchange platforms within the scope 
of the Directive as obliged entities. As a result, these entities would be obliged to 
adopt policies that aim at detecting, preventing and reporting money laundering and 
terrorist financing. Moreover, the Commission proposes that the particular entities 
should be subject to licensing requirements and that those who own or manage 
these entities be subjected to ‘fit and proper testing’.68 The Council of the EU 
confirmed the plans of the Commission to regulate both exchanges and wallet 
providers, however the European Commission decided recently to delay new anti-
money laundering legislation, i.e. to amend the 4AMLD, until June 2017 at the latest.  
In particular, an analysis of the above Commission’s proposals would lead to the 
conclusion that there is a call for alarm regarding the use of bitcoins as they are 
considered as easy to use in facilitating anonymous funds transactions for criminal 
purposes.69 In case of implementation of these proposals, exchangers and wallet 
providers that administer transactions between fiat and virtual currencies would 
likely be required to turn over client lists to authorities. Moreover, the Commission 
seems to consider the possibility of establishing a mandatory database of digital 
currency users in order to prevent anonymity of digital money traders. National 
financial intelligence units will be issued more powers, including the ability to 
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demand information from banking and financial services firms, regardless of whether 
reports of suspicious activities have been issued. Finally, the beneficial owners of the 
aforementioned business entities will be more closely monitored for tax evasion 
purposes and will be subject to severe non-compliance penalties.70 
4.8 Should bitcoins be regulated for anti-money laundering purposes? 
Even though the expansion of the use of bitcoin as a currency remains relatively 
limited, retailers, consumers and investors would probably welcome the existence of 
clear rules regarding the treatment of bitcoin in terms of regulation and taxation. 
Such clear and sensible rules that would include reasonable taxes and non-excessive 
administrative procedures, would give rise to the confidence of a great number of 
users in bitcoins and limit investors’ concerns71. On the other hand, opponents to 
bitcoin regulations feel that regulation will have a negative impact on the growth of 
digital assets. Furthermore, concerns are expressed that regulation in some 
developed countries will drive exchanges to countries with lower compliance 
standards and that transaction costs combined with administrative costs of 
regulation would outweigh the benefits since millions of users would be subjected to 
regulation.72  
In the context of anti-money laundering strategies and on the question of whether 
bitcoin should be regulated or not, it seems obvious that the complete lack of a 
regulatory framework would encourage criminals to pursue disguising their proceeds 
of crime through a system that fosters anonymity. A balance should be pursued 
between fostering the positive impacts of the use of bitcoin on the economy on the 
one hand, such as the promotion of innovation and technology, benefits for 
consumers like payments with extremely small fees, zero maintaining balance and 
no credit checks requirements and even larger-scale effects like social and solidarity 
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finance through block-chain technology in the under-developed countries, and 
avoiding fostering criminal activities through the bitcoin network on the other.  
The ideal regulatory framework that would achieve such a balance would be the one 
that implemented increased levels of transparency in the bitcoin marketplace73 and 
would render the bitcoin network a less attractive field of action for criminals. In this 
context, bitcoin miners should be required to register with an authority and follow 
predetermined guidelines, while bitcoin exchanges should be also subject to 
reporting requirements. The aforementioned Commissions’ proposals to be included 
in the amendment of the AML Directive constitute a step to this very direction, given 
that they render participants of the bitcoin marketplace, such as bitcoin currency 
exchange and wallet providers, obliged entities. These changes in the EU anti-money 
laundering legislation would promote transparency, deter money launderers from 
using virtual currencies and protect bitcoin investors at the same time. 
 
Conclusions 
The ‘money laundering’ term describes the methods and strategies employed by 
criminals who wish to disguise their proceeds of crime and present them as having 
been acquired otherwise than by crime.74 An international regulatory framework has 
been developed aiming at preventing and detecting the circulation of illegal funds in 
the financial system through the delegation of police powers to financial institutions 
and other legal entities or natural persons. In the context of EU legislation, the 4th 
money laundering Directive plays a predominant role in the fight against money 
laundering. The basic provisions of the Directive lead to the direction of 
implementing transparency principles as regards the identity and personal 
information of the ultimate beneficial owners of financial assets, e.g. the set-up and 
maintenance of a register of beneficial owners in each Member State. Amongst the 
proposed amendments to the 4th AML Directive, stands-out the designation of 
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certain entities, which perform business activities in the area of bitcoin trading, as 
‘obliged entities’, i.e. they will be regulated and thus take on the obligation to 
monitor or report information on their client’s identities. 
The vulnerability of the securities sector to money laundering activities is extremely 
high, given the complexity, the ease and the speed of the executed transactions 
which may very well be conducted in a cross-border framework. The degree of 
vulnerability is even higher in the case of intermediated holding systems which, by 
nature, are designed to foster the conduct of complex transactions in a fast and non-
complicated manner, while the identity of the investors is not recorded in a central 
register and is not revealed by documentation concluded between upper-tier 
intermediaries due to the fact that their contractual obligations do not include the 
fulfillment of duties towards the investor. This so called ‘no-look-through’ principle 
in this particular holding system creates a gap between the investor and the issuer, 
including the upper-tier intermediaries as well, that creates legal, technical and 
practical difficulties in identifying easily the investor and subsequently the source of 
the funds used to acquire the traded securities. As a result, law enforcement 
authorities would have an extremely difficult task to perform in identifying the 
beneficial owners of securities that are held by an upper-tier intermediary, probably 
in an omnibus account. In that context, transparency requirements within the 
framework of anti-money laundering policies seem to clash with the inherent 
limitations of transparency in the intermediated holding system. The only logical 
solution, if considered as technologically feasible, is the creation of a central register 
within the intermediated holding system where the identities of investors would be 
kept and be easy to access upon legitimate inquiries by law enforcement and judicial 
authorities. 
Not only in the intermediated securities area, but also in bitcoin trading, 
transparency problems seem to create a ‘friendly’ environment for potential money 
launderers. In particular, the fact that bitcoin constitutes a cryptocurrency where 
users operate under pseudonyms does not allow the identification of possible 
criminals who exploit the network for money laundering purposes. Indeed, while the 
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history of all transactions is recorded in the so-called ‘block-chain’ and is publically 
accessible, the users can hide their identities by employing anonymizing software. 
The Commissions’ proposals for the amendment of the 4th Money Laundering 
Directive, in relation to regulating virtual currencies, constitute a step to the right 
direction as they impose transparency requirements to entities that are involved in 
bitcoin trading. 
In general, as regards both the intermediated holding system and the bitcoin 
network, there is a common conclusion to be drawn: Any limitations posed on 
authorities acting under the requirements of the law in the fight against money 
laundering, whether these limitations are inherent or created by insufficient or 
ineffective legislation, regarding the fast and easy access to the personal information 
of investors in securities and bitcoin users, should be confronted with. In this 
context, the anonymity of both investors in securities and users of bitcoin is less than 
helpful in the fight against money laundering as it renders the connection between 
the proceeds of crime and the criminal difficult and unclear. 
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